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Editorial on the Research Topic
Self and Memory: A Multidisciplinary Debate
BACKGROUND
There is no consensus about the definition of autobiographical memory and its contribution to our
sense of self. Along the lines of Hoerl (2007), we organized the research topic by distinguishing
three strands of theorizing which vary according to how they construe the relationship between
autobiographical memory and the notions of episodic memory and self.
Autobiographical memory can be defined in terms of episodic memory, where the latter includes
a reference to the self. As Tulving puts it, “episodic memory differs from other forms of memory in
that its operations require a self. It is the self that engages in the mental activity that is referred
to as mental time travel: there can be no travel without a traveler” (Tulving, 2005, pp. 14–15;
emphasis added). Once this reference to a traveling self is built into the notion of episodic memory,
a further step may be taken by construing such notion in terms of the phenomenological construct
of prereflective self-consciousness. This path is taken, for example, by Prebble et al. (2013) who
proposed a framework for the study of sense of self and autobiographical memory where an
immediate and automatic sense of being the subject of experience (pre-reflective self-experience) is
seen as the precondition for episodic autobiographical memory, which in turn—in virtue of its
features of autonoetic consciousness and mental time travel—is a prerequisite for experiencing
unity in our subjective experience of selfhood across time (phenomenological continuity). Thus
episodic remembering makes it possible the unification of the self as a single entity that persists
across time (diachronic unity) by conveying “the inherent ‘mineness’ of the original experience into
the present moment” (Prebble et al., 2013, pp. 818–819). In contrast, semantic continuity is a form
of continuity that is not experiential but knowledge-based (the knowledge that the self exists over
time), mediated by semantic autobiographical memory which enables us to construct life narratives.
Other models, however, view episodic memory as “only one possible aspect or instance” of
autobiographical memory (Hoerl, 2007 , p. 637, note 4). For example, Conway (2005) argues that
episodic memories are experience-near sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective summary features
of short-time slices of experience, which are durably retained only if they have been embedded in
autobiographical knowledge structures; otherwise, they are rapidly forgotten. Within what Conway
terms “the self-memory system,” therefore, the notion of autobiographical memory is no longer
defined in terms of episodic memory; only conceptual organization of episodic memories within
the self-memory system transforms them into autobiographical memory and allows them to play
a role in constructing and maintaining a coherent, stable mental representation of the self (the
conceptual self) over time.
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In this perspective, in contrast to Tulving’s assumption
that remembering past events serves to establish the sense of
continuity of our self over time by virtue of a specific phenomenal
quality (i.e., the immediate feeling that “I” experienced the
remembered event), Conway proposes the opposite: it is the
conceptual self (the present Me) that selects and also distorts
personal memories so as to increase the sense of personal
continuity. As a consequence, self-continuity is not “provided by
the identity of the remembering I, but by the perceived similarity
of the present and past Me” (Habermas and Köber, 2015, p. 153)
A third approach, well represented by Katherine Nelson’s
work, takes autobiographical memory as a subclass of episodic
memories which involve a reference to the self, which is
viewed however from a social interactionist standpoint (see,
e.g., Nelson, 1996). The sense of self in time originates then
from social-communicative interactions, and especially from
sharing memory narrative which progressively lead children to
rationalize memories of their experiences in autobiographical
terms. Thus, Nelson meritoriously stresses more than other
authors the role of relationships in constituting a sense of self,
placing herself in the wake of an important and heterogeneous
tradition going back (with different accents) to Vygotsky and, in
the infant research and clinical domain, to the object relation and
attachment theories.
On the backdrop of these three theoretical perspectives,
the present research topic called interdisciplinary contributions
concerning the relationship between autobiographical memory
and the self, and notably their functional and dysfunctional
interactions. What follows is an overview of the contributions
that this research topic includes. It is divided into four sections
with headers that describe the subthemes of the issue.
MODELING THE LINK BETWEEN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY AND
SENSE OF SELF
Tippett et al. build on their aforementioned model of the
relationship between autobiographical memory and the self,
making the hypothesis that diachronic unity (i.e., the belief that,
despite changes, we are the same person across the lifespan)
rests on phenomenological continuity (i.e., the experience of
remembering the self over time during episodic recall). When
phenomenological continuity is disrupted, however, diachronic
unity can still be supported by semantic memory, which enables
us to construct narratives from which semantic continuity
emerges.
The hypothesis was tested in a study involving patients with
mild-to-moderate probable Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and with
amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), two conditions
where episodic memory deficits disrupt phenomenological
continuity. This alone should not lead to deterioration in
diachronic unity, provided that semantic continuity is well-
preserved; but if semantic continuity is also altered both in
AD and aMCI, there should be an associated deterioration
in diachronic unity. The latter was measured through a
self-persistence interview (beliefs about self-persistence,
explanations for stability/change); semantic continuity was
assessed measuring autobiographical reasoning (connections
between one’s conceptual self and the events of one’s life) and
(temporal, thematic, and causal) coherence of narratives.
The findings in both aMCI and AD groups confirm the
hypothesis that intact semantic continuity is sufficient to support
diachronic unity. In the aMCI group, the quality of life
narratives was largely preserved, as were measures of self-
persistence, indicating that even when the continuity afforded
by phenomenological re-experiencing is disrupted, semantic
continuity is sufficient to support diachronic unity. However, the
findings from the AD group indicate amore complex relationship
between diachronic unity and semantic continuity than originally
proposed in Prebble et al. (2013). For these findings reveal a
divergence between two aspects of diachronic unity: the AD
and aMCI groups did not differ from health controls in their
beliefs about their persistence over time, but patients with AD
showed deterioration in their ability to construct a sophisticated
justification for their persistence across time. The authors suggest
that in the AD group diminished life narratives that retain
features of cultural life scripts are sufficient for strong subjective
beliefs of self-persistence, but not for sophisticated explanations
about persistence. Better semantic continuity, with the ability to
weave high-quality life narratives, may scaffold the capacity to
understand and explain one’s diachronic unity, but this produces
less certainty about their self-persistence.
Wheeler and Gabbert adopt Tulving’s notion of episodic
memory as a specialized subcategory of memory relating to
the conscious recall of personally experienced events. Then
they usefully emphasize the distinction between a self-generated
cue and a self-referent cue—the former represents the critical
properties of a target memory; the latter acts as a cue relating to
an aspect of the self. On this background, they provide the first
overview of the research work that showed that self-generated
cues represent an effective and viable mnemonic technique which
can aid recall in a variety of settings.
The authors also theoretically contribute to this research area
by speculating on the memory mechanisms that lead to the
improvement of memory through self-generated cues. Three
mechanisms seem able to explain the effectiveness of self-
generated cues. (1) Spreading activation models which view
information in long-term memory as being represented by a
network of associated concepts. It is possible to recall a given
item from memory by recalling other information associated
with the target; this is made possible through the process of
activation spreading through the network. (2) The principles
of encoding-specificity (or encoding-retrieval specificity), i.e.,
the idea that retrieval cues are effective only to the extent that
information within the memory cue is also contained within the
target memory trace created at the time of encoding. (3) Cue
distinctiveness (or an absence of cue overload) which refers to
whether a cue is uniquely associated with a target memory—if a
cue is linked to multiple memory traces (and so is “overloaded”),
then it becomes more difficult for that cue to activate the
current target trace. The authors conclude by suggesting that self-
generated cues represent a promising development in episodic
memory domains.
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Vanderveren et al. shift the focus to memory specificity
and memory coherence, two characteristics of autobiographical
memory that have been related to psychological well-being
and the occurrence of psychopathology. To make a first
attempt at a theoretical integration of memory specificity
and memory coherence, the authors situate them within the
Self-Memory System (SMS). Concerning memory specificity,
people suffering from depression or PTSD are reported to
experience specific difficulties retrieving episodes and tend
to overgeneralise memories. Their semantically (rather than
episodically) structured memory impedes time traveling and
social life and, consequently, self-regulation—thus predisposing
to further suffering. Nonetheless, the whole overgeneralisation
literature can be traced back to Williams and Broadbent’s
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT), which attested specific
difficulties to retrieve personal memories cued by emotion words.
In AMT episodic memories are circumscribed by time (no
more than one day). Conversely, in SMS episodic memories are
defined by event-specific information, which is a unity given
by a continuity given by perceptual episodes not necessarily
coincident with AMT’s temporal slot; this discrepancy raises the
problem of understanding what AMT actually measures.
Coherent memories are also associated to well-being.
Coherence allows the construction of a unifiedmeaning, which in
turn promotes a sense of self-continuity. It is also a precondition
for self-regulation, to the extent that it allows a subsumption
of an event under a meaningful history. Nevertheless, some
theoretical problems still remain unresolved, mostly concerning
what relevant dimensions of coherence exactly are: temporal,
causal, or thematic coherence? Or a mix of the three? Moreover,
the prevalence of cross-sectional studies still leaves unanswered
the developmental question: is memory incoherence a genuine
predictor of psychopathology; or is rather one of its side effects?
The authors conclude by pointing out that the whole research
on memory would beneficiate from a more unified view on
specificity and coherence. More iterated models, such as SMS,
do not consider the two as separate dimensions, but rather
point out to their interconnectedness. Far from neglecting some
peculiarities, such as episodic amnesia leaving largely preserving
coherence, the authors still recommend further research from
a more integrated prospective. With its emphasis on the
interconnectedness between current personal goals (supervising
coherence), episodic, perceptually vivid traces and long-term
memories, SMS is in best position for this scientific new deal.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, LIFE
NARRATIVES, AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SELF-IDENTITY
Marchetti et al. focus on adolescence in the development of an
adult self, arguing that much more attention should be devoted
to the role of body, against a tradition that puts at the forefront
the integration of the psychic and the social. Indeed, according to
the authors, the body is from birth (and even from the uterus) a
constructive, and expressive vehicle of the self.
In order to understand how the body supports the
construction of the identity in adolescence, the authors suggest
using the method of analyzing what happens when something
goes wrong, on the assumption that adolescents choose the body
to express their discomfort, for instance, through self-injury. On
this background, the authors’ main thesis is that the capacity
to mentalize represents a critical forerunner of the adolescent’s
perception of the physical self, insofar as the body is a carrier
of implicit memories. Hence, troubles with mentalization in the
child involve repercussions both on the child’s behavior and the
adolescent’s psychic integrity. Violence against the physical self
(in adolescence) could be an answer to the necessity of a change
or an elimination of parts of a self- constructed in infancy and
embedded in a bodily, implicit memory.
Finally, the authors point out the importance, particularly in
adolescence, of taking into account one’s own body in relation to
others’ bodies (and others’ minds): relationships do not develop
only on the basis of a meeting of minds but also—and perhaps
primarily and at a deeper implicit level—on recognition and
synchronization dynamics, which are, according to the authors,
bodily grounded.
Rollo et al. represent the social interactionist standpoint by
combining two lines of research: the former on the different ways
in which mothers reminisce about shared past experiences with
their children, the latter on mothers’ use of mental state talk
during conversations.
Research indicates that mothers vary in the way in which
they reminisce about shared past experiences with their
children: “elaborative” or “narrative” mothers show a highly
elaborative reminiscing style characterized by long and detailed
conversations about the past, interpretation of events and actions
in terms of intentions and mental states, frequent references to
the autobiographical experiences of their children; “repetitive”
or “paradigmatic” mothers, on the other hand, show a less
elaborative style, talk less frequently and in less detail about
the shared past, focus on labeling objects, and specifying their
relations with superordinate categories, or on repeating the
exact content of a previous utterance. Children whose mothers
are more elaborative during reminiscing seem to develop more
sophisticated autobiographical memory skills, such that they tell
more detailed and coherent narratives about their personal past.
Besides narrative styles, a large body of research point
to the conclusion that the frequency with which mothers
use mental state talk (Mental State Language, MSL) during
conversations is positively and significantly associated with
children’s performance in theory-of-mind tasks and the
development of their psychological lexicon.
Given this background, the authors sought to put together
these two strands of research by examining the relation between
narrative styles and the use of MSL in maternal conversations
during joint picture-book reading. The results (i) confirmed the
validity of the distinction between Narrative and Paradigmatic
communicative styles; and indicated that (ii) maternal narrative
styles changed as a function of children’s age (the mothers
of 4-year-old children were more narrative than paradigmatic,
whereas the opposite pattern occurred for the mothers of 5- and
6-year-old children); (iii) the use of communicative terms was
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significantly more frequent for narrative than for paradigmatic
mothers, and decreased with children’s age; (iv) mothers adapted
the referents of their MSL to the children’s age (the mothers of
younger children referred their MSL more frequently to the book
characters, then to themselves or to the child, and lastly to the
dyad). Taken together, these results support the idea that mothers
adapt their narrative styles and MSL input to the growing
abilities of their children—as the latter develop and refine their
interaction skills, they move from a narrative to a paradigmatic
way of systematizing the reality around them –, thus contributing
to the development of sociocognitive understanding.
Veglia and Di Fini explore the universe of personal life-
narrations, taken as one of the privileged locus where people
try to attribute meanings and look for cohesion and hierarchical
order of internal and external information. Their analysis
considered different literary genres as well as clinical narrative.
Starting from an evolutionary perspective, they postulate the
existence of a biological disposition to identify as fundamental
six Life Themes: Love, Personal Value, Power, Justice, Truth,
and Freedom, laying beyond the apparent, superficial multiplicity
of narrations. Interestingly (but not surprisingly, given the
evolutionary perspective adopted), a Leitmotif of Life Themes is
their relational, interpersonal nature.
The authors delve into the analysis of the role of interpersonal
relationships—notably, autobiographical memories related to
attachment figures—in personal narrative construction. Most
narratives, indeed, are co-created, maintained and revised within
the attachment context: parental and domestic relationships
during infancy, wider contexts from later childhood on.
While confirming, along with the existent literature, that
since childhood secure attachment is related to narrations rich of
cooperating caregivers, the authors attest that clinical narrations
are characterized by a poor integration due to a rigid or,
alternatively, confused exploitation of life themes (“arrested
narratives,” “unbounded narratives,” “under narration,”
“denarrations”). Starting from this analysis, they suggest
that a deeper comprehension of life themes in psychological
suffering could help to improve clinical success.
Using the three axes presence/absence of positive or negative
narrative occasions, high/low integration, and control of/sharing
the theme, the authors identify areas of well-being and,
conversely, area of distress, together with important indications
concerning the nature of the suffering. This schema, which
is co-constructed and shared with the patient and founds a
solid therapeutic alliance, gives the therapist a precious tool
for envisage and reinterpret together with the patient crucial
junctions of her life story, concerning internal, psychological
aspects as well as interpersonal relationships.
Beyond its specific, clinical point, the main interest of the
paper is its amenability to profitably dialogue and enrich other
classical reflections on narrative, such as Dan McAdams’ thesis
of central nuclei in life stories and John Bruner’s perspective on
narrative genres.
Rathbone and Moulin introduce the construct of self-image.
One component of the Self-Memory-System is the “conceptual
self ” which is made up of self-images and self-beliefs. Self-images
are “I am” statements which are frequently used in psychological
research as a measure of identity, as primes in experimental tasks,
and as cues to elicit autobiographical memories.
The authors present a descriptive study investigating self-
images in adults aged 17 to 88. Participants were presented with
an online questionnaire (Study 2) and paper questionnaires/tasks
completed in participants’ own homes (Study 1) or in the lab
(Studies 3, 4, and 5). All participants were asked to generate a
set of between 4 and 20 “I am” statements to describe long-term
and enduring aspects of their identity. The aim of the paper is
to present a database of self-image norms, focusing on people’s
identity statements.
According to the authors semantic facts about the self may
be useful to scaffold narrative continuity and reflect the multi-
faceted nature of the self and they are a powerful tool for
examining differences in how identity is constructed.
Results revealed that the most commonly generated category
of self-image was a social role: Friend followed by Student, Sports
player, and Occupation. The less commonly generated category
was Articulate and Caring. The highest frequency traits were
Happy, Optimistic, and Friendly. Negative self-images (Lazy,
Worry, Pessimistic) were also generated multiple times. The
youngest self-image category generated was Maths (e.g., “ok at
maths”) and the oldest was Serious (e.g., “serious minded”). The
most frequently cited self-images for females aged 60–70 was
Mother.
Lavazza is concerned with the modulation and potentiation
of memory and their relationship with personal identity. In fact,
several neuroethicists have recently addressed the use of new
possible tools to erase or mitigate negative personal memories.
After giving an outline of the state of the art of research in this
domain, the author discusses the ethical status of these practices
and shows how this can be differently assessed according to
different views of the self. In this respect, he takes as being very
important the distinction between (partially) normative theories
of the self (such as John Bruner’s and Marya Schechtman’s
narrative theories), and purely naturalistic theories of the self
(e.g., Peter Carruthers).
The artificial alteration of identity will be taken ethically
unacceptable only on those conceptions and models of personal
identity and self-according to which these act as reference points
also for a wider set of values. For instance, some authors
complained that chemical alteration of one’s memory might lead
to non-authentic choices. The idea is that the choice must be in
line with the “true” self, to the extent that this latter notion makes
sense.
Narrativist theories are inclined to put in question the idea
of a strong self, in virtue of their insistence of the continuously
tentative character of personal identity. Narratives write and
rewrite life stories incessantly. By contrast, neurobiological
theories of the self-promote a strong idea of the self, for
they identify the psychic healthy state in a neurobiological
condition. Use of drugs aims at maintaining this condition.
Hence, Lavazza seems point here to a contradiction: use of
molecules to modulate memories is ethically (more) allowed
if one endorses a weak notion of the self, but neurobiological
approaches to the self are committed to a strong notion of the
self.
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TRAUMA AND DISRUPTION OF
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Hart et al. aim at assessing the relationship between
neuropsychological functioning (notably, working memory and
cognitive flexibility), Post-traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD),
and trauma centrality, i.e., the extent to which a traumatic event
is taken as central to one’s identity and a turning point in the
story of our life. To this empirical research based on a cross-
sectional design took place 41 Iran and Afghanistan veterans.
Although some features of the study (small and full masculine
sample, use of on-line neuropsychological test) suggest further
investigation, a correlation emerges. While a growing body of
empirical research has already well-established the association
between, on the one side, PTSD symptoms and trauma centrality,
and, on the other side, neuropsychological disorders and PTSD,
the possible correlation between neuropsychological functions
and trauma centrality is the main focus of this study.
Beyond replicating the solid data attesting the other
correlations, the present research shows that lower levels of
working memory and (even if results only approach significance)
cognitive flexibility are associated with trauma centrality (ceteris
paribus, i.e., when measures of depression and PTSD are
controlled). However, the results, which are coherent with
the well-known overgeneralization of memories in traumatized
people, cannot shed light on the direction-of-causality question,
as cross-sectional studies assess all the variables at the same time.
Typically, cognitive deficits are unidirectionally taken to
affect trauma centrality and, more generally, identity; but things
could be more complex and interwoven, as suggested by
Conway’s work. In his Self-Memory System Conway postulates
a strict, continuous and bidirectional relationship between
long term mnemonic structures and the working self, i.e., the
hierarchical structure containing currently active personal goals.
In this theoretical framework, deficits in working representations
affect long term self-structures, conceived both as episodic
memories and normative, semantic self-structures. Working
self constantly mediates between the opposite requirements of
internal coherence and correspondence to reality, allowing only
the “right kind” of new acquired information to be stored in
long-term memory. SMS postulates also the opposite causal
direction, suggesting that permanent structures of the self-
influence current decisions taken by the working self. As well
shown in Conway et al. (2004), structures of personality—in their
Bowlbian perspective, internal working models—not only are
modulated by, but also modulate working self ’s functioning.
Carletto et al. view Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD)
as the crucial disorder to investigate autobiographical memory.
They present Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing
(EMDR) as the therapeutic technique able to re-elaborate non-
integrated memories and to consolidate new memories into
the already existing semantic links, promoting the insertion of
traumatic but no longer disturbing memory in a coherent and
adaptive autobiography.
PTSD is a disorder that develops in some people who
have experienced a shocking, scary, or dangerous event. People
who have PTSD may feel stressed or frightened even when
they are not in danger. The diagnosis include at least one
re-experiencing symptom (e.g., flashbacks—reliving the trauma
over and over, including physical symptoms like a racing heart
or sweating, bad dreams, frightening thoughts), at least one
avoidance symptom (e.g. staying away from places, events, or
objects that are reminders of the traumatic experience, avoiding
thoughts or feelings related to the traumatic event), at least
two arousal and reactivity symptoms (e.g., being easily startled,
feeling tense or “on edge,” having difficulty sleeping, having
angry outbursts), at least two cognition and mood symptoms
(e.g. trouble remembering key features of the traumatic event,
negative thoughts about oneself or the world, distorted feelings
like guilt or blame, loss of interest in enjoyable activities).
Traumatic memories are encoded differently than memories
of ordinary events, in multisensory fragments that traumatized
people cannot integrate in a structured narrative. From
a neurobiological point of view, during extreme stressful
situation amygdalar synapses are potentiated and this saturate
all amygdalar alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole
(AMPA) receptors-bindings sites. Consequently, in the
hippocampus the recorded emotional memory trace cannot
be merged with the cognitive memory trace and the fragments
of emotionally charged memories remain trapped in the limbic
system and cannot be transferred to the cortical areas, where
a further processing and integration into already existing
networks should take place. Therefore, non-processed emotional
memories remain trapped and unchanged at subcortical level
without contextual integration, causing in some cases PTSD
symptoms.
If memories are adequately processed, PTSD symptoms can be
mitigated and memories integrated. EMDR is the psychological
treatment for PTSD presented by authors. The key aspect is
the use of Alternate Bilateral Stimulations (ABS) such as eye
movements (EMs).
Authors describe how EMDR works during the PTSD
treatment from a neurobiological point of view, mentioning the
same mechanism involved in sleep for memory consolidation,





Mancini and Mancini describe ImRs (“Imagery Rescripting”), a
therapeutic technique that aims to reduce the distress associated
with negative memories of early aversive experiences. It consists
of prompting patients to rescript the autobiographical memory
in line with their unmet needs.
The ImRs procedure is based on two steps: (i) change in
perspective, from child’s one to adult’s one; (ii) try to meet the
child’s unmet needs. The second step requires empathy: empathy
on behalf of the adult validates the child’s suffering. This makes
explicit the rewriting work: the (negative) meaning inferred
during childhood (e.g., in attachment relations) is overturned in
the recognition of the child’s suffering.
ImRs has proven to be effective across several
psychopathologies such as depression, social phobia,
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obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and personality disorders. Yet, the mechanisms through the
result is obtained are not properly understood. The hypothesis
of the authors is that ImRs acts by reducing the meta-emotional
problem, i.e., by reducing the perception of a negative emotion
as something problematic and unacceptable. A large literature
mentioned by the authors seems to show that themeta-emotional
problem could be a trans-diagnostic phenomenon. Yet, since
there is still a lack of direct evidence that ImRs reduces the
meta-emotional problem, the authors propose an experiment to
test their hypothesis.
In sum, the authors argue that ImRs promotes the reduction
of symptoms and of negative self-belief both by changing the
valence of the aversive autobiographical memory and by reducing
their accessibility—both approaches offer a plausible explanation
of the observed reduction in negative self-belief. However, they
also believe that these approaches are not very accurate in
clarifying how the change in self-belief occurs. They suggest
establishing a link between the change occurring in the beliefs
about one’s own emotion and the change occurring in self-belief.
Kalsi et al. present the first neuroimaging meta-analysis
which report the changes in functional neural activity as an
effect of pre- and post-treatment of psychotherapy versus
pharmacological therapy in patients with affective disorders
(anxiety and depression).
The main outcome is the inverse effects of cognitive
and psychodynamic psychotherapy and antidepressant therapy
on the right paracingulate activity. The patients undergoing
psychotherapy showed an increase in the right paracingulate
activity while pharmacological treatment led to a decrease of
activation of this area. The authors conclude that this finding
seems to support the recent studies that hypothesize how
psychotherapy, through the self-knowledge and the meaning
processing, involves a top-down emotional regulation.
What is most remarkable for the Research Topic is that
the paracingulate cortex activity seems to be associated with
autobiographical memory—as well as with other self-monitoring
activities (visual self-recognition, conflict monitoring, verbal self-
monitoring, self-generated thoughts) and mentalizing abilities.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this Research Topic “Self and Memory:
A Multidisciplinary Debate” was to offer a snapshot
of the growing cognitive, developmental, and clinical
psychological literature on the complex relationship
between autobiographical memory and the self against
the background of the main theoretical approaches in this
research area. The final collection of 12 articles does exactly
that and provide hints about where this research area is
going.
The contributions have all a multidisciplinary character,
but some of them focus more on one of the three strands of
thinking around self and memory described above (line 17),
others focus mostly on issues in the blossoming empirical
literature of psychology, psychopathology, and neuroscience
of self and memory. More specifically, Tippett et al., Wheeler
and Gabbert, and Rathbone and Moulin’s papers make the
most of Tulving’s approach to autobiographical memory;
Vanderveren et al., Veglia and Di Fini, and Hart et al.’s
contributions build on Conway’s perspective; Marchetti et al.,
Rollo et al., and Lavazza take advantage of Nelson’s approach
to autobiographical memory. Finally, the contributions of
Carletto et al., Mancini and Mancini, and Kalsi et al. focus on
clinical issues that cross-cut the three theoretical perspectives—
EMDR and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders; the influence
of Imagery Rescripting on the aversive autobiographical
memory; neuroimaging data about the effects of pre-
and post-treatment of psychotherapy vs. pharmacological
therapy.
We hope that the reader will find the collected articles both
informative and thought-provoking, and that this Research Topic
will serve to stimulate new theoretical debate and empirical
research.
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